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 Reference as Representation 
 
In modern documentation theory and practice, documents are often viewed as 
content holding forms. Indeed, in the information science tradition that Paul Otlet 
could be said to have originated, ‘information’ is understood as the meaningful 
content of documents. Information is said to be ‘fixed’ by documents as physical 
objects. As Balnaves and Willson (2011) argue, what they call the Otlet tradition 
of information differs from what they call the Cutter tradition because in the latter 
it is the material item (e.g., the paper document or the virtual document) that is 
called ‘information’ or ‘document,’ whereas in the Otlet tradition it is the 
ideational content of such that is seen as being the information or document. 
 For Otlet the content of documents (i.e., its information) are 
representations of the world. This means that all documents, as information 
bearing texts, are ‘scientific’ in the mode of a positivist or representational view 
of science. Moreover, Otlet in his Traité de documentation: le livre sur le livre: 
théorie et pratique (Otlet, 1934) has a hierarchy of documentary representations, 
starting from the representation of particular entities to the depiction of the 
essence of such entities. Following a metaphysical and epistemological tradition 
from Plato (with his notion of ‘ideas’ as the true content of individual entities) and 
Aristotle (for whom philosophy, too, sought the essences or ‘truth’ of entities) up 
until the modern period, for Otlet the highest scientific truths are found in the 
most abstract, or ‘abstracted’ documents, drawn from other, more descriptive 
documents. Documentation is seen as becoming more scientific in its collection of 
scientific texts when it reduces them to their essence or ‘aboutness,’ just as 
scientific texts are viewed as having reduced individual entities (e.g., individual 
frogs) to their essence or truth (e.g., universal frog behavior or any other aspect of 
their ‘frogness’). 
 Both the representational aspect and the hierarchical reductionistic aspect 
of Otlet’s documentation theory and practice can be seen in the following two 
illustrations, respectively, from Otlet’s 1934 book, Traité de documentation: le 
livre sur le livre: théorie et pratique (Otlet, 1934). It should be remembered that 
far from exemplifying a forgotten moment, Otlet’s epistemological commitments 
sometimes continue today in documentation and information science theory and 
practice in the activities of indexing, information metrics, and information 
visualization, among many other research and professional activities. 
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Illustrations from Otlet (1934) 
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  In the first illustration we see knowledge depicted as representations of the 
world in the mind and in various documentary materials, such as books, and most 
iconically, photographs. In the second, we see how the work of science and 
documentation (at its highest level and most ‘scientific’ manner for Otlet) is 
understood not as naïve empirical representation or experimental representation 
(Frohmann, 2004; Shapin, 1984), but rather as representative assertions of truth 
about the world. In a return to Aristotelian and medieval science, facts don’t 
belong to empirical events, but rather to documentary signs and theory, though in 
a highly reductionist documentary form—namely documentary abstracts, 
classification taxonomies, and ultimately bibliographic codes (such as 
classification numbers). At the highest levels of knowledge and truth, documents, 
for Otlet, do not represent beings, things, and events, but the essences of such.  
Such essences and their relationships are shown in ontologies, taxonomies, and 
classification schemes.  
 
Documents as Pictures 
 
For Paul Otlet, documents contain assertions—statements—of truth about the 
world. The collection of such statements/documents constitute what Otlet called 
(after the theological concept of the book of God) “Le Livre” (“the Book”), which 
like Otlet’s notion of a world library, or, literally, Otlet’s Mundaneum, constitutes 
the total picture of the world via collections of statement/documents. 
 In the language of contemporary philosophy, Otlet’s epistemology is 
called a ‘picture theory’ of knowledge. A picture theory epistemology holds that 
truth resides in the correspondence of statements to states of the world. What 
separates picture theories like Otlet’s—or most famously that of the philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus—from the naïve 
empiricism of John Locke and others British philosophers and experimentalists 
(Shapin, 1984) of the 17th and 18th centuries, is that the former is not empiricism 
at all, but a type of representationalism or ‘positivism’ which aims to depict 
essential and universal truths about entities in the statements of science, rather 
than seeing such statements (theory) as being provisional and possible (or likely) 
explanations about the results of experiments upon particular entities. That is, 
picture theories follow a correspondence theory of truth, understanding truth as 
the correspondence of descriptive (i.e., statements) or literal pictures about the 
world and the essential reality of entities—in terms of medieval philosophy, 
adaequatio rei et intellectus.  Theoria in Ancient Greek means to look at things 
from a distance; in the philosophical tradition and in modern positivism, it is 
precisely this distance that is understood as necessary for seeing the entity in its 
truth, a truth that may be hidden by the phenomenological changes of individual 
beings and entities. 
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  Indeed, Otlet’s epistemology of documents as representational statements 
of facts and his understanding of universal bibliography as the representation of 
the world in its totality so closely resemble Wittgenstein’s ‘logical positivist’ 
epistemology in the latter’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that one could easily 
substitute “document” for “fact” in the second and third propositions that begin 
Wittgenstein’s (1921) work, as I do below: 
 
 1.  The world is all that is the case. 
 1.1.  The world [of knowledge, i.e., collections of statements—
books, the documentary collection/library/catalog; “Le Livre”] 
is the totality of facts [statements/documents], not of things. 
 1.11. The world [of knowledge, i.e., collections of statements—
books, the documentary collection/library/catalog; “Le Livre”] 
is determined by the facts [statements/documents], and by 
their being all the facts [statements/documents]). 
 
  Otlet’s Traité not only repeats the epistemological assumptions of logical 
positivism expressed in works such as Wittgenstein’ Tractatus, but his Traité also 
uses some of the same formal, rhetorical devices as Wittgenstein did in his 
Tractatus, namely ‘atomic’ rhetorical units (akin to Otlet’s “monographic 
principle” of atomic documents), rhetorical units that are built up into more 
complex rhetorical units (such as paragraphs, book sections, chapters, etc.). In this 
way, and through the use of simple sentences (representing simple statements) 
and “monographic” paragraphs and book sections built into larger wholes, the text 
performs the analytic-synthetic science that it asserts as the true form of 
knowledge. This can be seen not only in the rhetorical form of the Traité’s text, 
but also in the documentary organization of the text as a whole, according to an 
analytical-synthetic numerical system. For example, compare the numerical 
rhetorical form of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (as quoted above and modified for 
content) to the table of contents in Otlet’s Traité: 
 
 
Numerical organization in the table of contents of Otlet (1934) 
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 Sense in Reference 
 
If the Otlet tradition (Balnaves and Willson, 2011) of documentation and 
information sees knowledge and truth as an issue of picturing the ‘aboutness’ of 
things (in other words, picturing their essential information or ‘content’), then 
what is peculiar is that such an epistemology directs that one must abstract away 
from particular entities in order to get such universal or essential pictures.  
To put it succinctly, the performance of truth in a representational notion 
of theory or documentation cannot find any equivalent in natural entities, per se, 
just as bibliographic abstracts and other forms of metadata representation must 
represent a text in another (at least much more reductive) form than that text. 
Frogs cannot be represented as to their essence except by abstracting away from 
particular frogs; they must be represented at a distance by their evidential or 
documentary essence.  And so, consequently, we need to see that this 
documentary version of scientific representation is itself an essentialist, universal, 
and ‘typological’ epistemological and rhetorical performance, grounded in 
ontologies and taxonomies of types of entities rather than individual entities per 
se.  
In the Western metaphysical tradition, reaching from Platonic and 
Aristotelian philosophy to modern positivist notions of knowledge and truth (that 
is to write, the entirety of Western philosophy understood as metaphysics), one 
must leave entities and go to statements of their essence in order for their essential 
truths or ‘truth’ to occur. One must depart from entities as particular in 
themselves, and rather believe that they contain essential elements of ‘aboutness’ 
that pertain to not only their own being, but that of others of their ‘type,’ and one 
must believe that this is where true knowledge or ‘truth’ lies. Not coincidently, 
this is also the method of representation in modern documentation via indexes, 
abstracts, titles, etc.—what used to be called ‘metalanguage’ and is now more 
frequently called ‘metadata.’ ‘Aboutness’ in modern documentation is the 
epistemology of the Western metaphysical tradition of representing essentialist 
evidence, in both theory and practice.  
Documentation as ‘information’ is Western metaphysics, and Western 
metaphysics, from the very beginnings of Western philosophy and ‘thought’ until 
now proceeds through the material practices of documentation and the theory of 
documentation as a monological, evidentiary, practice and theory of knowledge 
and truth.  
For this reason, studies into the politics and sociology of Western 
expansion throughout the world should take into account both Western 
metaphysics and both the theory and the practices of documentation in supporting 
such expansion. Equally, there can be no complete account of the appearance of 
‘Europe’ in the modern period or ‘the West’ without accounts of the expansion 
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 and management of the colonies and more indirect ‘Western influence’ through 
documentary metaphysics and material documentary practices (Mignolo, 2003). 
 Indeed, the technology that we associate with the modern tradition of 
documentation (as well as with philosophy itself since Plato and Aristotle)—
‘writing’— is well suited to Otlet’s epistemology of representation, because it 
asserts not through dialogue, but through writing as a form of statement and 
broadcast. Writing itself is the activity of reading what someone else has written; 
even dialogues, such as Plato’s dialogues, perform ‘monologically,’ not 
dialogically through ‘writing.’ ‘Writing,’ as we have known it as ‘documents’ is 
monologic communication toward, in the modern sense of the term, 
‘information.’ By their very nature, monologic inscriptions lend themselves to an 
epistemology of statements or assertions, to giving information about 
something—to being signs or indicators of what is not readily apparent without 
theory (at the very least in terms of naming or nomenclature and in terms of 
systems of identity and differences). 
 What happens to the modern documentation—or, more generally, the 
modern documentary—paradigm if modern documentary tools, such as index 
cards, are no longer the means by which something becomes meaningful as 
knowledge?  
We can begin to answer such a question by way of a contrast: in acts of 
conversation things, actions, and events are more or less agreed upon 
(‘understood’) based on each participant in a conversation trading with the others 
their senses of what to think or act upon a thing, being, or event in a situation. 
Here, ‘aboutness’ is not based on documentary naming and representation, but on 
dialogue and pragmatic, and often temporary, agreements to proceed with the 
conversation or to act on it. Clarity and distinctness of reference in conversations 
may be incomplete at any one moment, but this does not stop actions from 
coming from such, and, in fact, the continuance of interactions among the 
participants is what they hope will lead to better understanding and actions.  
 In communication, unlike documentary information, reference is less 
determined by representation, and it is more determined by multiple senses. As 
documentary systems approach the radical temporality and dialogical qualities of 
communicative functions then they take on more communicative notions of 
‘information,’ and this has radical effects upon how we understand both 
documents and a modern notion of information that has come from the 
documentary tradition of the past twenty-five hundred years, but particularly 
during modernity. 
 Buckland (2015) has suggested that with modern documentation systems 
we often lose the “context” or sense that gives referential meaning to terms. This 
is because ‘aboutness’ is representationally determined through bibliographic 
nomenclature, classification, and domain specificity, for example, but with a very 
6
Proceedings from the Document Academy, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/docam/vol3/iss1/6
DOI: 10.35492/docam/3/1/6
 diminished linguistic grammar and an even more impoverished, what we’ll call, 
‘social grammar.’  So, for example, in ordinary language the word “fire” in itself 
is hardly sufficient to account for different types of fires and their effects. (For 
example, to know if I should run out of the house or if I should approach the 
fireplace, I need to understand the term not only in a broader linguistic grammar, 
but also, in a social situation.) And to understand whether and with what I should 
fight an out of control fire, it would helpful to have someone to converse with, so 
that I can then better measure the threat and so that I can better work with this 
other person in order to contain or extinguish the fire.  
 At minimum, linguistic meaning requires three types of sense affordances 
for expression: 1) a cultural form (the form of a word—e.g., in English, “fire”), 2) 
a socially normative use (how the word is deployed in a given social situation—
e.g., “fire!”), and 3) a physical or physically imagined situation (the physical 
situation and entities to which the term refers, alone or in combination with other 
words—e.g., “there is a fire in the house”). These cultural, social, and physical 
sense affordances give to an expression its referent. From this, we derive the 
notion of a representation or an ‘idea.’ Representations are consequences of these 
three affordances for expressing and making sense. 
 Modern documentation systems make up for their lack of the second and 
third affordances, by the use of ‘controlled’ systematic identities and differences 
and syndetic references (e.g., “’dog,’ not ‘cat’”; no ‘catdog’ in LCSH; for 
“’canine’ see ‘dog’”), by subdivisions (geographic and temporal), and by thesauri 
structures of broader, narrower, and synonymous terms, among other techniques. 
Even then, however, reference fails if there’s still ambiguity in language or if 
users lack knowledge of the indexing structure being used.  
 In brief, modern documentation systems lack many of the elements of 
ordinary language that help work out ambiguities and create possibilities for 
understanding and action to occur. In contrast with ordinary language, controlled 
vocabulary and classification ‘languages’ are strange and very reduced, and so 
their abilities to express and reference are poor. We would never expect anyone to 
communicate in ordinary language with something like Library of Congress 
Subject Headings, but because of the materials and metaphysics within which 
modern documentation systems evolved, we have relied on such things to 
organize and access knowledge.  
 In regard to limited domains of language use, largely of a representational 
kind, documentary systems of pre-coordinate indexing and classification can work 
well enough to represent or at least index documents made up of limited 
discursive grammars (e.g., ‘frog’ in scientific texts likely refers to a type of 
amphibian and is not likely to be used as a derogatory term for French people, and 
so constitutes an adequate descriptive term for locating scientific documents and 
information on such amphibians). But in more heterogeneous domains of 
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 language, the representational means of traditional indexing and classification 
miserably fail in creating reference. Representational ‘naming’ fails in providing 
the complex grammars or ‘sense’ needed for making, understanding, and acting 
upon expressions in most of our daily and even professional interactions; that is, 
for creating meaningful references. For this reason, modern documentary 
techniques need to be repurposed or improved upon in order to come closer to the 
power and flexibility of ordinary language. We will return to this topic shortly in 
a brief discussion of post-documentary technologies. 
  
‘Literature’ 
 
In order to better understand the limits of reference through representation in 
modern documentation, it is helpful to look at a counter-tradition to such. The 
emergence of the category of “literature” in the 18th century as a genre for 
fictional works and poetry is an excellent case. 
 In Otlet’s works, the ultimate epistemic form for a document is that it be 
evidence of a “fact.” It does this through representations, which themselves are 
claimed to be facts, and as we have seen are the basis for the claimed facticity of 
the essential being and relations of the world. The facticity of entities in the world 
relies upon documents of their essential nature; such essential natures 
paradoxically give to entities their facticity. In Otlet’s work, ultimately it is the 
documentary evidence of the fact that becomes the fact, and the facticity of the 
entity depends upon this. 
 Literary works pose an issue for such a notion of reference for several 
reasons. First, literary works can be said to be about many different things, and so 
for this reason a work in literature is not bibliographically described by the 
‘aboutness’ of its content, but rather as evidence of an author’s oeuvre or literary 
genre or historical period—that is, it is described by form and function. Second, in 
regard to the realist tradition of literature, though the goal of such works is 
representation, this is done at the level of imagined empirical description, rather 
than that of the description of the essences of entities. In realism, it is the 
immediacy and particularities of individuals as individuals that are depicted, even 
when they represent social or psychological types (as in Émile Zola’s novels, for 
example). Third, an abstract or summary of a novel or poem is not seriously 
claimed to be the meaningful equivalent of such; the rhetorical performance is so 
integral to the meaning of the original work that an abstraction of its ‘aboutness’ 
is seen as constituting a different work altogether. We cannot know the character 
of Emma Bovary very well without reading Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. The 
representation of Emma Bovary is known through the complex sensual 
presentation that the work uses to express the character. And last, particularly in 
the modern avant-garde tradition of literature and especially in poetics, the 
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 meaning of the work lies in its performance or being read, which lends to it a 
radical temporality of meaning; the ‘ideas’ in a Shakespearean play depend on 
reading or live performance for an audience of a given time and place.  
 For these reasons, the Western tradition sees such works as works of 
‘rhetoric’ or sophistry or artistry, and not of philosophy (and in modernity, 
science). And literary texts and literature in the modern period find an 
uncomfortable fit in the genre of documents and information, even though such 
texts have physical documentary form and they give, in some meaning of the 
term, ‘information’ to the reader or audience. In Otlet’s Traité there is an 
awkward ambiguity to the meaning of ‘littérature,’ meaning both inscriptions 
generally and literature as a genre of aesthetic or artistic works. 
 The category of literature (as a genre of aesthetic or artistic works) 
contests: 1) documentary representations of essences and hierarchies of 
abstraction without losses of meaning (as we saw in the two, earlier, Otlet 
illustrations), 2) the ‘fixed’ or permanent nature of representation claimed by 
documentary descriptions as descriptions of the essential information or 
‘aboutness’ of texts and entities or cases in the world, and 3) universalist claims 
toward the representation of knowledge in a text or in the world. Instead, literary 
works in modernity refer through empirical particulars, and their claims of truth 
are either based on performance and self-reflexivity (as in the avant-garde) or 
analogical modeling and a reader’s application—‘imagination’ (the realist 
tradition). 
 The category of literature as having these genre characteristics is unique to 
the notion of fictional and poetic works in the modern period. Earlier literary 
works had these qualities, of course, but the notion of ‘literature’ as something 
more sensual, both more descriptively realistic and more self-reflexively material 
and aware of its construction than scientific documentation, is a modern 
phenomenon. Possibly its development was a reaction to the essentialist and 
universalist claims of science as a science of documentary representation, as well 
as being an aesthetic extension of empirical realism in early modern science 
without the latter’s use of technology and method. 
 In literature, sense is stressed as a means of reference. Even with when 
representations are used, they are used in a mode of descriptive empirical 
completeness and artifactual awareness. Representation is inflected through the 
performance or presentation. Imagined and real situational affordances play an 
important role in giving meaning to cultural forms. In realist fiction, on the one 
hand, complex social affordances combine to give meaning to terms and to 
present imagined situations that work as models for the reader. And on the other 
hand, with the artistic modern avant-garde, social norms are contested by 
technique, resulting in the defamiliarization and ‘making bare of the devices’ of 
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 the social, cultural, and material technologies operating in both the literary and 
artistic works and the documentary modes of representation that they critique. 
 
Post-documentary Technologies 
 
Recent computational information and communication technologies, which I call 
“post-documentary,” may incorporate documentation techniques of information 
retrieval, but toward more communicative ends. 
 Technologies such as social network algorithms, GPS enabled locators, 
and recursive computing algorithms increase the cultural, social, and physical 
attributes of indexed terms and thus can vastly increase the precision and 
flexibility of reference for both human and machine users and agents, particularly 
in real-time interactions. Consequently, the notion of ‘documents’ can move 
closer to communicative functions.  
 Post-documentary technologies produce multiple ruptures within the 
modernist opposition of (scientific) documentation and literature. In regard to 
modern documentation, post-documentary technologies introduce time-valued 
and site-specific indexing and retrieval. They shift the meaning of ‘information’ 
from a documentation to a communication perspective, from a monologic to a 
dialogic determination of reference. Historically, they mark a substantial shift 
from the monologic tradition of documentation, suggesting to some that we now 
live in an increasingly oral cultural environment, paradoxically led by the 
booming use of computer mediated communication and document retrieval.  
 Post-documentary technologies challenge both the a priori nature of 
knowledge as documentation and the meaning of ‘literature’ as an oppositional 
term to ‘documents’ and ‘information,’ in the modernist sense of these terms. It is 
claimed that post-documentary technologies are concerned with indexing and 
representing particulars, performatively in real time, and with a greater descriptive 
completeness (in the case of social big data, for example) as compared to 
traditional documents. By producing time-valued and site-specific narratives with 
particular agents in a broad range of knowledge, emotions, and social interactions, 
post-documentary technologies encroach upon the very meaning of ‘literature’ in 
modernity. Two differences that remain are, first, that of ‘showing the devices’ of 
their own constructions (which are notoriously opaque in the case of online 
algorithms and indexing), and second, that narrative fiction still largely appears as 
representation rather than as lived presentation (and so remains in opposition 
within the same register—representation—as that of modern documentation).  
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 Conclusion 
 
What remains clear in regard to documents and information today is that ‘sense’ 
is making sense again in regard to information. Today’s post-documentary 
technologies cross what were distinct information, communication, and media 
ecologies. 
 In ways both technological and (perhaps still lagging) socio-culturally, the 
modern age of documentation is past. But in other ways, perhaps, it continues on, 
but is now sometimes sublimated to higher levels of infrastructural embeddedness 
or abstraction (Day, 2014; Thomas, 2013).  
 Reference, meaning, and sense in the post-documentary age still needs to 
be thought, but this task is more momentous than that of a mere disciplinary 
considerations in information science or documentation.  Asking ‘what is a 
document?’ today is asking ‘how can one think and be?’, against the backdrop of 
the modern documentary tradition and Western metaphysics. 
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